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Abstract: We analyze the effectiveness of protective measures in a differentiated products
framework using highly disaggregated data. The extent of the data and level of disaggregation permits us to separate the aggregate effect of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
into reduction, diversion and compression effects. We find that multilateral tariffs reduce
trade flows to a greater extent than has been implied by previous work, and that trade
preferences have a significant diverting effect. We also find that higher multilateral tariffs
tend to shift trade towards larger exporters: this suggests that the desire to minimize fixed
costs associated with trading dominates any preference for variety. In the case of NTBs,
we find that, as often as not, the imposition of an NTB leads to an increase in the value
of trade; in industries with low import demand elasticities, the influence of rising prices
outweighs the decline in quantity. Finally, our analysis of factors that influence the effectiveness of trade barriers suggests that barriers tend to be less distortionary in industries
characterized by significant product differentiation.
JEL Classification: F12,F13
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I. Introduction
There are many queries one could make into the nature of barriers to international
trade. Principal among these is the effectiveness of various tariff and non-tariff measures
or their impact on multilateral and bilateral trade flows. The expected impact of various
measures of protection on trade flows is an integral component in investigating many other
issues related to protection; for example, the pattern and height of barriers to trade across
industries, or the expenditure of lobbying effort by labor in search of protection. Similarly,
the outcome of trade liberalization initiatives is seldom an across the board tariff cut,
instead, it may be biased towards protective measures that provide relatively little in the
way of protection for domestic industry.
In this study we therefore analyze differences in the effectiveness of tariffs and
several types of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) across disaggregated industries. We further
identify specific distortions of bilateral trade flows that can arise from the imposition of
these barriers and provide evidence on the industry-specific determinants of the significant
cross-industry ,variability in the effect of trade barriers. In so doing, we extend the literature
on the impact of protection in several ways. First, unlike previous studies, we separate
the effect of tariffs and NTBs into a reduction effect which is a lowering of overall trade,
a compression effect which is a concentration of the source of imports into the largest
exporters, and a diversion effect which is a shift in trade patterns across exporters that
is unrelated to size.

This type of decomposition has a great deal of policy relevance

as it permits the identification of specific channels through which protection affects the
magnitude of trade, as well as the relative strengths (effectiveness) of these channels.
Second, our approach allows for large samples so that we can consider regressions
for narrow commodity groups; this not only mitigates specification error due to structural
differences in the determinants of trade flows across commodities, but it also allows for
industry by industry comparisons of the effects of barriers. For example, we are able to
1
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analyze the extent to which factors, such as capital and labor intensity or the homogeneity
of goods within an industry, influence the effectiveness of measures of protection. This
breadth of new results is made possible by the use of data that is significantly more
disaggregated than is typical of this literature.!
Our analysis indicates that, in addition to the expected reduction of trade caused
.by barriers, there is significant diversion of trade flows resulting from the preferential
application of tariffs, and that tariffs tend to shift trade towards larger exporters. We
interpret this latter effect as a desire to minimize a fixed cost of trading that is related to
the number of countries with which an importer trades. In other words, with fixed costs,
even a constant multilateral tariff can redistribute trade towards large countries; i. e., trade
with small exporters is sacrificed first.
In the case of NTBs, we find that

th~

price raising effect of an NTB frequently

dominates the quantity reducing effect, resulting in an increase in the value of trade between
two countries. In addition, we find evidence suggesting that countries not targeted by price
,

and quantity NTBs can either gain or lose at the expense of targeted countries. We also
find that the existence of a tariff tends to mitigate the price raising effects of an NTB; that
is, when a tariff and NTB are applied simultaneously, the impact more closely resembles
the expected effect of the tariff alone.
Finally, our analysis of factors that influence the effectiveness of trade barriers finds
that the effectiveness of tariffs and NTBs is positively correlated to industry characteristics
related to import demand elasticities and negatively correlated with the extent of product
variety in the industry, which is itself related to the industries import demand elasticity.
In particular, we find that tariff barriers are less effective in the presence of a demand
for variety and bilateral preferences are less important for goods with a greater degree of
product differentiation. We are also able to explain upwards of 90 percent of the variability
in cross-industry variation in the estimated coefficients of commonly used determinants of
bilateral trade flows such as distance, a common border and a common language. Further,
we reaffirm the results found in Rauch (1998) that the lack of an organized exchange or
reference price for a commodity increases the i~portance of certain linkages (e.g., language)
between exporters and importers in determining the volume of bilateral trade.
1 See, for example, Harrigan, 1993, Trefler, 1993, and Leamer, 1988 and 1990, for recent contributions to the
literature. Anderson, 1985, states the case for the use of disaggregated data based on the finding that aggregation
significantly reduces estimated elasticities. Although differences in methodology make a direct comparison
suspect, our results do suggest that trade elasticities are larger than is found in the studies mentioned above.
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In the next section we present the model that serves as a framework for estimation.
Following that, we discuss the data and empirical specification. Results are presented in
Sections 4 and 5 and Section 6 concludes.

II. General Comments on the Effects of Barriers
The simplest theories of protection focus on competitive markets with homogeneous
goods and uniform tariffs and/or NTBs. Their partial equilibrium results are well known:
the value and volume of imports fall with the imposition of tariffs, while NTBs lower the
volume of imports, but may raise or lower the value, depending on doemstic supply and
demand elasticities. In order to address bilateral trade more generally, we resort to more
recent models based on monopolistic competition and demand for variety.
The simplest of these models generates· the following prediction for bilateral consumption patterns

where Mij

.. _ l'i}j
M I) (1)
,
Yw
is the value of bilateral imports, l'i and Yj are the incomes of trading partners

i and j, and Yw is world income. With added structure, bilateral imports between i and j

in commodity k can be characterized by

(2)
where

Pik

= L I'fYi(pttt)l-11
I

is a price index over imported varieties,
specific tariff,

of

pj is j's price for commodity k, tfj is an exporter-

is the share of good k in country i consumption,

I'j is

k's production

share in country j, and u is the elasticity of substitution between foreign varieties.
The impact of uniform protective measures in this model is identical to that in the
traditional model in that imports from all countries contract. The effect differs, however,
in the case of preferential barriers. A model with a homogeneous product predicts that all,
or as much as possible, of a country's imports will be sourced from the low tariff country;

i.e., the elasticity of substitution between imports, u, from different locations is infinite.
In a differentiated products model, we can expect that imports will continue between the
importer and a variety of exporters due to consumer demand for variety.

4
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Equation (2), however, is limited in its ability to expressly disentangle multilateral
from bilateral effects; hence, we build upon equation (2) by allowing the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties to differ from that between foreign varieties.
The value of trade flows is generated as follows: consumers allocate expenditures first
between domestic and foreign varieties based on a constant elasticity of substitution, p.
The choice between foreign varieties is then a secondary consideration and foreign goods
substitute for one another with an elasticity

(j

which may differ from p. Imposing this

structure on the differentiated products model yields: 2
M~. - [( Pki Tjk)-Pj
I) -

r~

,

~ ~Yiy:. (p)~t~.)-U
I)
a, /) I )
p!c

(3)

,

where

IS

a price index covering domestic and foreign varieties (and modifies the consumption

share parameter to incorporate substitution between home and foreign varieties),
a price index over domestically provided varieties, and

Tjk

pr is

is country i's average tariff on

commodity k.
According to equation (3), imports from j are a function of i's average tariff,
bilateral tariffs, tfj' Alternatively, we could redefine

Tjk,

and

pj to incorporate the average tariff, at

which point tfj is equal to the deviation of the tariff faced by country j from the average.
This model captures the notion that a uniform tariff will lead to a uniform contraction
of trade from each exporter (the reduction effect) while the impact of preferential tariff
reductions will lead to a reshuffling of imports across exporters (the diversion effect).
An additional effect that is not incorporated in (3) arises from the presence of fixed
costs of trading with additional countries; for example, there could be costs associated with
establishing and maintaining lines of supply and means of transport. The sensible introduction of the notion of fixed costs requires the presence of both product differentiation
and love of variety. Since the absence of either characteristic makes the implication of
country-specific fixed costs trivial. That is, without varieties, the size of the tariff determines the quantity imported and imports are purchased from the smallest possible number
of countries; note that this describes the equilibrium even with a zero tariff.
Keeping the framework as simple as possible, we assume that the supply side is
characterized by increasing returns to scale that are internal to the firm. As presented by
2 A formal derivation is presented in Appendix A.
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Helpman and Krugman (1986), this specification leads each country to produce a number
of varieties, where that number is proportional to the country's size. The supply of each
variety will be the same, and the price of each variety can be normalized to one without
loss of generality.
On the demand side, we assume that each importer is small, and utility is of the
form

n

U

=

II x· Vi,
i=1

where n is the number of countries with which the importer trades, x is the equilibrium
quantity of each variety consumed, and Vi is the number of varieties produced by country i;
in equilibrium, larger countries produce more varieties. Utility is then maximized subject
to:
n

E

= F· n + T

•X •

LVi
i=1

n

~

N,

where E is the level of expenditure on imports, F is the per country fixed cost,

T

is the

tariff and N is the maximum number of possible exporters. 3
We simulated this specification for a variety of tariffs and fixed costs. The results
are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates the impact of increasing fixed costs
on the number of exporters for tariffs ranging from zero to 100 percent. The set of possible
exporters is set to 100 countries increasing in size, where the largest is 100 times the size
of the smallest. With zero fixed costs, and sufficient expenditures, the importer consumes
some of every variety. With a small fixed cost, the importer ceases trade with the smallest
exporter only if the tariff exceeds 65%. As the tariff rises above 65%, additional exporters
are dropped, but at a decreasing rate.
Figure 2 gives an idea of what happens to the number of varieties that are imported
conditional on the tariff and level of fixed costs. Again, in the absence of fixed costs, the
importer imports every possible variety. For a given positive level of fixed costs, raising
the tariff reduces the number of varieties imported, but at an increasing rate.
The convexity of the change in number of exporters, combined with the concavity
of the change in the number of imported varieties implies that higher tariffs, given fixed
3 See Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire, 1997, for an alternative and more complex modelling approach.
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Figure 1
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costs, eliminate trade with first the smallest country and, as the tariff rises, with countries
increasing in size. Consequently, a given level of expenditure on imports is spread across
a declining number of the largest countries. In other words, in the presence of fixed costs,
a given tariff should have a trade reducing impact that varies inversely with country size.
This presence of fixed costs results in a compression of trade into the largest potential exporters of the commodity, and compression becomes more severe the larger the
tariff. The intuition is simply that a larger tariff effectively reduces the consumer's expenditures on imported commodities. Holding the number of countries fixed while reducing
expenditures implies that fixed costs are an increasing fraction of the value of imports.
In the limit, this fraction can exceed the expenditure allocated to imported varieties and
their consumption ceases. Along the way to this limit, if the fixed cost is uniform across
countries, the contraction of imports results in a disproportionately high share of expenditures on varieties from small exporters going towards the fixed cost. Hence, imports
from smaller suppliers will be dropped first. Dropping one exporter frees up the previously
incurred fixed cost, which serves to increase purchases from the larger exporters, perhaps
in excess of the no-tariff value.
In sum, tariffs need not be preferential in order to alter bilateral trade patterns.
Preferential tariffs concentrate imports in low tariff countries (the diversion effect), while
fixed costs of trading concentrate trade in the hands of a small number of large suppliers
(the compression effect).
Until now, we have said little about NTBs. In some studies (see, for example,
Leamer (1990)), t or

T

represent generic barriers to trade rather than tariffs specifically.

The impact of an NTB is presumed to be qualitatively identical to that of a tariff. Indeed,
in Leamer's analysis of NTBs, he finds anomalous the result that NTBs increase the value
of trade. It is possible, however, that NTBs raise price to a greater extent than they lower
quantity, thus raising the value of the bilateral trade flow. Nonetheless, we also interpret t
and

T

broadly as any barrier to free trade. At the same time, however, we expect there to

be instances where the imposition of an NTB serves to raise the value of imports, or the
preferential absence of an NTB lowers the value of imports from unencumbered exporters;
this is in contrast with predictions for tariffs.

8
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III. Data and Empirical Specification
Our empirical specification is based on (3) and is a regression of bilateral trade
flows on determinants of those flows. The estimating equation and its relation to (3) is
perhaps best understood if we first consider the available data on trade flows, tariffs and
NTBs.
We use the 1994 UNCTAD TRAINS dataset which is an inventory of bilateral
tariffs, NTBs, and trade flows for 51 importers and 235 exporters. We limit our analysis
to the 15 most developed importers and 65 most developed exporters listed in Table 1.
The dataset documents trade barriers in a particular year between 1990 and 1993 for each
bilateral pair and provides trade flows for a specific year during the period 19S8-1992; the
year varies according to the importer. The trade barrier data is present at the tariff line
which is generally the 8 or lO-digit Harmonized classification system (HS) level. The data
include extensive information regarding the preferential incidence of barriers, including
tariffs and some 80 different varieties of NTBs. These preferences include MFN and
tariffs in

~ddition to

asp

those arising from formal trade blocs. We collect the NTB varieties

into four types on the basis of structure and primary effects. The NTB categories depend
on whether they have direct price effects (PRICE), quantity restrictions (QUANT), quality
restrictions (QUAL), or involve a threat of retaliation (THREAT).
Unlike the barrier data, trade flow data are only present at the 6-digit HS level;
hence, analysis is limited to observations at this level. The tariff for each 6-digit category
is calculated as the simple average across all tariff lines in that category. The measure for
each NTB imposed in each 6-digit HS category equals one if any tariff line in that category
is subject to an NTB and is zero otherwise. 4 Table 2 provides import weighted average
trade barriers for each importer as well as the trade weighted NTB coverage ratios. The
numbers for the latter are the import weighted fraction of the 6-digit HS codes covered by
the particular type of NTB, as well as an aggregate NTB coverage ratio (ALL). Of the 15
i"mporters, 10 have an import weighted average tariff of less than 4%. On the other hand
most importers have a significant incidence of NTBs.
With' trade and barrier data on each of 15 importers and 65 exporters for more than
5000 commodities, we can consider regressions for narrowly defined product categories. We
identify each of the HS categories with a three digit SIC code, which is the level at which
4 This approach appears reasonable because we found in a sample of product categories that a majority (more
than 90%) of NTBs are imposed against all tariff lines for a 6-digit HS category.
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Table 1
Countries

Importers
Australia
Austria
Canada

European Union
Finland
Hong Kong

Japan
South Korea
New Zealand

Norway
South Africa
Sweden

Switzerland
Taiwan
United States

Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
Spain

Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad/Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

Export,ers
Algeria
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia

Congo
Czech Republic
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India

Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Kenya
South Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria

Table 2
Aggregate Trade 'Barriers
(Import weights are from 1991, unless otherwise specified.)
Non-Tariff Barriers: Coverage Ratios
Year

93
93
93
93
93
93
93
92
93
93
93
93
93
92
93

Importer
Australia l
Austria
Canada
European Union 3
Finland!
Hong Kong
Japan 3
South Korea
New Zealand
Norway2
South Africa3
Sweden 1
Switzerland 3
Taiwan
United States

Tariffs

All
NTBs·

Price

6.7
1.7
3.6
3.1
1.4
0.0
4.8
8.7
7.7
0.7
12.7
1.2
0.0
5.9
3.6

11.0
72.6
20.3
10.1
10.6
29.9
36.6
1.6
0.7
17.6
22.9
26.7
33.7
45.9
24.2

0.1
67.8
0.5
4.3
2.2
0.0
1.2
0.0
0.7
8.6
0.0
4.2
0.9
0.0
14.2

Quantity

Quality

Threat

0.0
4.6
2.2
2.0
1.4
0.3
7.5
0.6
0.0
2.3
3.1
1.2
5.1
0.3
10.1

6.7
3.6
17.7
4.1
8.2
29.6
34.4
1.6
0.0
9.1
22.9
24.8
29.2
45.9
0.4

4.3
1.4
1.8
3.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3

• As more than one type of NTB may be imposed on a given sector, the coverage ratio for
"All NTBs" is less than the sum of the four separate categories.
2Trade weights from 1990.
3Trade weights from 1992.
ITrade weights from 1988.
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our regressions are performed. That is, each regression includes observations on bilateral
trade at the 6-digit level spanned by a particular 3-digit SIC group. For example, there
are 21 6-digit HS codes that map into SIC 227, carpets and rugs; thus the carpets and
rugs regression includes 21 commodity flows and barriers for each importer and exporter
palr. A listing of 3-digit SIC codes is found in Appendix B.
Turning to the specific form of our estimating equation, we begin by taking the
logarithm of equation (3)
In(M~·)
= - plnT~
- ui~·
I)
I
I)

(4)

+ In(af) + In(-Yj) + In(}i) + In(Yj)
- uln(p~) -lnrf - pln(pik ).
Each of the right hand side variables can be replaced by constructed tariff and NTB
variables or an appropriate set of dummy variables.

Trade Flow Data: A trade flow observation, M~, is the dollar value of bilateral
imports for individual country pairs i and j for a particular 6-digit HS code k. For the
majority of country pairs the trade flow is zero, thus we augment the observed positive flow
data with zero flow observations. As some zero observations are the result of trade barriers,
the inclusion of zero flow observations avoids bias and inconsistency induced when such
observations are omitted from the sample. We do not, however, include zero observations
when the exporter does not export this good to any country, or the importer does not
import the good from any country. We recognize that such omissions may introduce error
if the failure to export or import is due to barriers. However, the lack of trade may also
be due to a small (or zero) scale of production or level of consumption; in such cases, the

inclusion of zero observations can lead to error. Our prior is that the latter phenomenon
is more pervasive and hence the omission of these observations is appropriate.

Trade Barrier Data: The first line in equation (4) implies a pair of trade barrier
variables: the average barrier imposed against all exporters and an exporter-specific term
that incorporates trade preferences. The first of these we denote as a trade reduction
effect, Tik , and the second as a trade diversion effect, ifj' As noted above, these effects can
result from NTBs as well as tariffs, hence we incorporate in our regression both NTB and
tariff effects. Thus, there are two separate effects (reduction and diversion) for each of four
NTB types, in addition to those for tariffs. The trade reducing effect, hereafter T ARf, is
calculated as a trade weighted average of the bilateral tariffs imposed by country i in HS

11
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category k. This variable reflects changes in a price index of imported varieties relative
to the domestic price level, and an increase will reduce imports as consumers substitute
domestic for foreign varieties. The weights are each country's multilateral exports at the
5-digit HS level; this weighting scheme is chosen to reduce the bias due to simultaneity that
would result from using 6-digit imports as weights. The tariff diversion effect, T ARDiv~,
reflects variability in the applied tariffs across countries and captures the extent to which
preferential tariffs lead to diversion from one variety of the good (defined by country of
origin) to another. We calculate this variable for each exporter as the difference between
the tariff it faces and the average tariff faced by all other exporters. The effect is expected
to be negative: a high relative tariff diverts trade away from a particular exporter.
For each of the four NTB types (PRICE, QUANT, QUAL and THREAT) the
reduction effect, NT

Bft, is a trade weighted (using exports at the 5-digit HS level) NTB

coverage ratio for NTB type 1 imposed by country i on commodity k. Although higher
tariffs lower both the volume and value of trade, an NTB can increase or decrease the
value of trade, depending on domestic elasticities. Hence, the sign of the coefficient on the

NT Bft regressors is dependent on these same elasticities and we anticipate both positive
and negative coefficients for this effect; negative when the quantity effect dominates the
price effect and positive otherwise. The diversion effect, NTBDivfjl' indicates the extent
to which an NTB diverts trade from exporters facing the NTB towards

~nencumbered

exporters. For countries exempt from the NTB, this variable is positive and equal to the
proportion of countries covered by the NTB, and it is negative and equal to the proportion
of countries exempt from coverage for constrained exporters. Hence, positive values for this
variable indicate relative advantage while negative values indicate relative disadvantage;
our prior is that advantaged countries will experience an increase in bilateral trade and
hence the coefficient will be positive.
While not explicit in the above model, there is a third effect of barriers that arises
from the presence of fixed costs. As noted earlier, fixed costs can lead to a compression of
trade into fewer partners than would be observed in the absence of barriers. We expect the
existence of fixed costs to increase the extent to which countries import from large potential suppliers by diverting trade away from smaller suppliers (or, alternatively, we expect
a disproportionately smaller tariff reduction effect in the case of exporters who are larger
than the average). The tariff compression effect is measured by TARCompt which is the
product of T ARf and the exporter's export potential, measured as that country's exports

12
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at the 3-digit SIC level. Note that the raw coefficient on TARf must now be modified
if it is to maintain its original interpretation. That is, the compression effect operating
on a country with the mean exporter potential must be added onto the raw TARf coefficient. The adjusted coefficient is reported throughout the results section. The reported
coefficient on T ARCompt is then the change in the trade compression effect that results
is
from differences in size across exporters. The NTB . compression effect, NTBComp~'I'
y
similarly defined.
Finally, we include what we call the NTB mitigating effect of a tariff which arises
from the coincident application of a tariff and an NTB. The variable capturing this effect,

T ARf· NTBf" is expected to have an effect opposite in sign from the coefficient estimate on
the NTB variable. The imposition of a tariff lowers the value of trade, and the imposition
of a quota in the same industry can raise or lower the value of trade in the absence of a
tariff. In the event that both a tariff and a quota are applied in a perfectly competitive
industry, the effect would mirror that of the tariff, lowering the value of trade relative to
that resulting from the lone application of an NTB.

Commodity Dummy Variables: Though we include only related commodities within
each regression, there may still remain some commodity specific effects. In particular, with
identical preferences,

of will be the same across importers and have only cross-industry

variability. Hence we include a separate dummy variable for each 6-digit HS good to
mitigate potential bias that may. arise from differences across disaggregated industries.

Importer and Exporter Dummy Variables: The use of country dummy variables
eliminates country-specific effects. These effects are most clearly evident in the second
line of equation (4) via importer and exporter incomes Yi and Yj and exporter specific
effects arising from

/'1, the production share parameter.

Under the assumption that the

HS categories included in each regression are sufficiently comparable,

1'1 varies only across

countries and not across goods. The exporter dummy variables therefore capture differences in production levels across countries. 5 Note that by including importer dummies,
we also control for the effects of differences in the share of the importing country in total
world spending.

Country Pair and Other Effects: There is little question that various relationships,
5 It could be argued that the explicit inclusion of production would be more appropriate. Not only is it infeasible
to include production levels, but it might equally well be argued that the differences in production levels are
attributable to differences in factor endowments, in which case our dummy variable approach provides sufficient
control variables.
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quite apart from economic differences, between countries can influence trade between country pairs. Rather than attempt to incorporate country pair dummies, we include some
of the more popular measures from the gravity equation literature, to which our framework is related. Country pair characteristics include the distance between major economic
centers in the two countries (DI STij ), whether or not a common land border is shared

(BORDERij), and whether or not a common language is spoken (LANGij). Finally, the
last line of equation (4) includes terms that fold into a constant. The

rf

term, assum-

ing competitive price responses by domestic producers, takes on the value of 2, and p~ is
constant if world prices of imported varieties are assumed equal to one another. 6
Accordingly, our estimating equation takes the form

In(Mf;)

= + ojEj + WiMi + KkHk + !3lDISTij + !32BORDERij + !33LANGij
+ olln(TARf) + o2In(TARDivfj) + o3In(TARCompfj)
+ L[XllNTBf, + X12NTBDivfjl + XI3NTBCompt+]
Q

(5)

I

+ LXI4TARf· NTB~
I

where the first line includes a constant, exporter (E), importer (M), commodity (H) dummies, and the country pair variables. Tariff variables are on the second line and reflect
reduction, diversion and compression effects, respectively. The third line includes the NTB
variables, where 1 runs over NTB types PRICE, QUANT, QUAL and THREAT. For each
type of NTB, there are variables that reflect, again, reduction, diversion and compression
effects. The terms in the fourth line are interactions of NTB and tariff variables.
Econometric problems: Since the data contain a large number of zero values for

the dependent variable we use a standard Tobit estimator. Further, the existence of simultaneous equation bias in a framework such as ours has been widely discussed. In our
regression the potential for simultaneity arises from two sources. First, there is the endogenous protection argument that, while protection is directed at reducing imports, high
levels of imports are a cause of protection. Note, however, that barriers are imposed prior
(often, years prior) to the observations on flows. A past trade flow may be the cause of
a barrier, but current flows cannot cause the imposition of a barrier in the past. Second,
the use of trade flows to construct average levels of barriers can introduce simultaneity. In
6 Alternative assumptions merely place these terms in the importer and exporter dummies.
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our calculations we use exports at the 5-digit level to weight tariff variables at the 6-digit
level. As such, trade weighting as a source of bias and inconsistency is reduced as the left
hand side of the regression is only a small part of the trade weight on the right hand side.
Before proceeding to the results, a word of caution is necessary about the quality of
the NTB data as measures of trade barriers. First, it is our understanding from UNCTAD
sources that the definition of a barrier is quite loose: whether something is considered to
be a barrier is a matter of either the judgment of the UNCTAD staff or an exporter has
reported some importer's policy to be a barrier. This, of course, introduces the possibility
of measurement error in our NTB variables. Second, if an NTB is non-binding (for example,
a quota where trade is less than the quota), then this is a further source of measurement
error. While the effect of measurement error in a regressor is statistically identical to the
effect of simultaneous equations error, the remedy is not the same; that is, instrumental
variables estimation is not possible in this setting. Note that, with highly aggregated data,
one is less likely to find a non-binding restriction across all commodities in a 3 or 4-digit
industry category, though, of course, aggregation error when using 3 or 4-digit data may
be greater than the error from nonbinding barriers.

IV. Results
We estimate the parameters in equation (5) separately for each of 167 3-digit SIC
industries. For some of the industries a confluence of too few observations and many regressors created convergence problems so that we have estimates for only 158 industries.
For several reasons, however, not all trade effects are available for each of these 158 industries. First, on occasion we encountered perfect multicollinearity. In such cases we dropped
one of the variables so that the remaining regressor's coefficient reflects the effects of both
regressors; hence, the regression provides no information on the separate effects of the
collinear variables. Second, certain of the NTBs are not imposed by any importer for some
industries.
For the sake of brevity we do not present all regression results, rather, in this section
we present summary statistics and give an indication of the distribution of coefficients. In
the next section we consider industry characteristics and their relation to these regressions
results. In Table 3, we provide regression summary statistics. On average, there are 3,693
observations in each regression, about three-quarters of which are zeros. We also explain
roughly 24 percent of the observed variability of trade flows.
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Table 3
Regression Summary Statistics

Mean
Minimum
Maximum

St. Dev.

Observations
Number Percent Zero Pseudo-R 2
3,693
76.0
.236
58
53.2
.134
18,374
91.0
.423
3,814
7.0
.050

In Table 4, we provide summary information on the trade effects across all industries. The left-most column lists trade effects and the middle columns give the distribution
of the coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The right-most
four columns give the number of coefficients estimated (All/Count) as well as the mean
of those coefficients (All/Mean) and the number of significant effects (Significant/Count)
and the mean of the significant coefficients (Significant/Mean). We do not present the distribution of all coefficients - regardless of significance - since that distribution is similar to
the distribution of significant coefficients (although it has greater variability and a higher
concentration around zero). In Table 5 we provide the mean estimated coefficients, for all
coefficients as well as for significant coefficients, by 2-digit SIC industry. The left-most
columns give the 2-digit industry name as well as the codes that comprise the industries.
Note that the list of industries moves roughly from less product differentiation to greater
product differentiation; that is, the SIC codes provide a rough measure of the extent of
product differentiation across industries with product differentiation being more common
in higher numbered SIC categories. The next four columns of Table 5 contain mean estimates for the tariff effects, the next four provide means for the main NTB variables, while
the final three columns relate to other influences on bilateral trade patterns.
In general, the results for the tariff variables indicate that high average tariffs
reduce trade and compress trade into larger potential exporters while tariff preferences
result in significant trade diversion. Note that while most of the reduction and diversion
coefficients are either insignificant or have the expected negative (and significant) signs,
there are cases of positive, significant effects. As discussed in Appendix C, these results
need not be considered anomalous. What is striking is that the tariff coefficients are large.
We find that the demand for imports is on average very elastic, with a mean (for all
coefficients) of -5.4 while the mean for diversion is -8.1. This corresponds to an elasticity

Table 4
Distribution of Significant Coefficient Estimates l

<7l
<7l
<7l

...

c

..

ell

::l

.0

<-10

(0
r-l

(-10,-8)

Tariff Variables
Reduction
40
10
Diversion
61
24
Div-Red 2
26
10
Compression
1
NTB Reduction Variables
Price
2
1
Quantity
6
1
Quality
10
2
Threat
5
NTB Diversion Variables
Price
1
Quantity
2
Quality
2
Threat
1
NTB Compression Variables
Price
Quantity
1
Quality
Threat
Country Pair Variables
Distance
1
Border
Language

(-8,-6)

(-6,-4)

(-4,-2)

17
13
15

12
9
12

5
5
6
3

2
1
7
1

1
1

6
4
10
1

4
1
15

1

2

4

2
2

(-2,0)

I

(0,2)

1 I
5 I
~ I
4 I 36

4

(2,4)

(4,6)

1
1

2

1

2

1

7

65

(6,8)

1

(8,10)

>10

Count

Mean

Count

3

4
2

93
119
72
88

-6.6
-10.2
-17.1
2.0

146
153
141
158

-5.4
-8.1
-1.6
0.8

6
6

29
28
61
14

2.3
-11.2
-5.8
686.2

138
101
137
66

2.5
-2.5
-3.2
151.9

1.1
3.3
-19.8
0.8

90
69
57
40

2.4
1.2
-13.7
-0.2

Mean

32

8

2

2

I

1

I
I

3

3
4
6

2
3
3
1

2
2
1

3
1
1
1

1
2

2
2

1

1

26
35
26
12

3

37
28
61
19

0.0
-0.5
0.4
-53.7

151
101
142
67

0.0
-0.1
0.2
-15.0

158
151
107

-2.2
2.5
1.0

158
158
158

-2.2
2.5
0.7

I

2

All

Significant

I

~

2 I 3
2 I 12
8 I 3
3 I
15 I 21
9 I 15
111 47
6 I 3
84 I
I 63
1 I 101

9
7
4
1

2
1

70
5

2
7
1
1

6

1

14
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lDetailed regression results are available from the authors.
2Div-Red = Diversion - Reduction and is a statistic generated from the estimated coefficients. Significance is based on a one tail t-test of the null
hypothesis that the Diversion coefficient is smaller that the Reduction coefficient.
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Table 5
A verage Coefficient - By Aggregate Industry
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::l
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SIC Category
Label
#
01-09
10-14
20
22-23
24-25
26-27
28-29
30-32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
01-09
10-14
20
22-23
24-25
26-27
28-29
30-32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Ag/Forestry/Fishing
Mining
Food
Textiles/Apparel
Lumber/Furniture
Paper/Printing
Chemicals/Petroleum
Rubber/Leather/Stone
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Industrial Machinery
Electronic
Transportation
Instruments
Misc. Manufufacturing
Ag/Forestry/Fishing
Mining
Food
Textiles/Apparel
Lumber/Furniture
Paper/Printing
Chemicals/Petroleum
Rubber/Leather/Stone
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Industrial Machinery
Electronic
Transportation
Instruments
Misc. Manufufacturing

Tariff Effects
Reduction Diversion
-5.4
31.3
-5.3
-4.2
-14.3
25.6
-1.8
-6.2
-23.7
-9.5
-7.1
-2.6
-12.4
-3.5
-2.7
-5.5
9.9
-8.4
-7.4
-20.3
37.4
-6.7
-8.3
-40.1
-11.1
-7.8
-5.2
-13.5
-7.3
-6.5

-19.9
48.9
-6.6
-6.0
-12.8
-22.8
-6.7
-9.1
-18.0
-9.9
-9.7
-10.3
-12.3
-11.4
-13.5
-14.4
46.9
-7.9
-6.1
-14.8
-15.3
-9.4
-10.2
-18.0
-11.9
-10.5
-10.3
-14.2
-11.4
-13.5

Div-Red Compression
-14.4
69.1
-1.3
-1.7
3.2
-44.8
-4.9
-2.9
5.7
-0.4
-2.6
-7.7
0.1
-7.9
-10.8

Other Effects

NTB Reduction Effects
Price

All Coefficients
-0.3
2.7
-6.7
-5.2
1.2
1.4
1.6
-48.3
0.8
0.1
0.5
0.8
3.5
0.4
1.4
17.0
2.8
105.8
8.5
1.9
2.1
-0.9
1.3
0.3
2.6
-3.0
0.9
0.1
1.2
-0.1

Quantity Quality
-0.5
2.6
0.1
2.7
1.4
-44.7
-2.2
-10.9
1.8
-117.3
12.0
35.2
6.0
34.4
3.1

Significant Coefficients
-50.4
0.1
10.2
-4.6
-107.6
-22.1
-22.9
-23.3
-8.4
1.7
6.5
4.3
-6.3
2.1
28.1
2.3
-14.6
2.0
-5.6
-60.0
1.1
.-9.9
-11.5
3.6
-1.1
-3.3
-8.6
2.3
-4.5
-4.6
-15.4
7.0
12.0
-6.3
2.9
-3.3 -260.5
-6.1
2.1
27.6
-8.7
1.5
27.4
1.5
-7.9
2.8
-4.4
-9.6
1.2
105.6
-10.8
1.7
6.0
0.9

Threat

Distance Border Language

-2.2
-19.0
-2.6
-3.2
-0.2
-8.1
-2.9
0.1
-0.6
-1.0
-4.6
-2.2
-2.1
-3.3
2.5

1.6
-6.7
-5.6
-36.3
-38.4
16.1
-83.5
70.0
-0.5
1828.9
20.2
26.5
0.4
-131.2

-2.3
-4.1
-2.3
-1.8
-2.2
-2.0
-2.5
-2.0
-2.7
-1.8
-1.8
-1.6
-2.1
-1.3
-1.3

3.4
4.3
2.9
2.4
2.7
1.9
2.3
2.7
2.7
2.1
1.3
1.3
2.3 .
0.9
1.8

0.5
0.1
0.6
1.1
1.2
1.0
0.3
0.7
0.5
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.8
0.6
0.7

-3.9
-36.5

21.1
-49.9
-60.2

-2.3
-4.1
-2.3
-1.8
-2.2
-2.0
-2.5
-2.0
-2.7
-1.8
-1.8
-1.6
-2.1
-1.3
-1.3

3.4
4.5
2.9
2.4
2.9
2.0
2.3
2.7
2.7
2.1
1.3
1.3
2.7
1.1
1.8

1.1
1.1

~-3.8

-4.5
8.8
-24.7
-6.1
2.1
-

-1.6
-8.8
-5.0
-4.5
-6.2
3.2

-

22.3
-179.8
-

10880.6
43.2
30.8

-

0.9
1.2
1.2
1.3
0.7
0.9
0.8
1.0
0.9
0.6
1.2
0.6
0.7
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of substitution of 5.4 between home and foreign varieties and 8.1 between foreign varieties.
A greater degree of substitution between foreign varieties than between home and foreign
suggests a significant home bias; perhaps because domestically produced varieties more
closely approximate the ideal variety. This relationship holds generally true for industry
by industry comparisons as well as for the means. In Table 4, we include a row that shows
the industry by industry differences in the diversion and reduction coefficients (DIV-RED),
while in Table 5 we provide a column with the industry by industry differences. The
diversion coefficient is negative and significantly less than the reduction coefficient in half
of all cases, 72 out of 141 industries. Further, note that when the difference is significant
the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods exceeds the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign varieties by 17.1 percentage points. This suggests a tremendous
potential for trade diversion due to the preferential application of tariffs.
Before turning to the NTB effects we note that their results should be viewed with
caution for several reasons. First, as noted above, there may be substantial measurement
error in the NTB measures. Second, the number of coefficients we estimate is often many
fewer than the number of tariff effects estimated, and, even when we are able to estimate
NTB coefficients, the results are often based on very few NTBs. 7
As is the case for the tariff reduction measures, the results for the NTB reduction
measures largely conform to our priors. The price, quantity and threat variables each
have roughly equal numbers of significant positive and significant negative measures while
the quality effect tends to be generally negative. As discussed above, the sign on these
variables depends on the elasticity of import demand; positive coefficients may occur for
industries with particularly low demand elasticities so that the price effect dominates
the quantity effect. 8 We examine this hypothesis by comparing the signs on the NTB
reduction coefficients with those for the tariff-NTB interaction term (T AR~ . NTBf,).
If the hypothesis is correct, then the two coefficients should be of opposite sign. For
NTB reduction coefficients with positive signs, the coefficient of T AR~ . NTBf, should be
negative; in this case, the tariff eliminates the price effect, leaving only the quantity effect
on the value of trade. Conversely, a negative coefficient should be paired with a positive
coefficient on T ARf . NTBft; here, the quantity effect is accounted for by the tariff and
7 See Table 2 and the frequently small NTB coverage ratios for specific types of NTBs.
8 Note that this elasticity effect would incorporate any shift from lower to higher "quality" goods (and hence
from lower price to higher price goods).
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the positive coefficient will prevent double-counting. We find this relationship in about 65
percent of all cases, and in 62 percent of the cases where both coefficients are significant.
Turning to the NTB diversion effects, we find that when price or quantity restrictions are applied selectively, there appears to be a positive impact on countries not
covered by the NTB. In the case of price NTBs, there is a positive trade diversion effect in
20 of 26 significant cases. Similarly, a positive diversionary impact is recorded for 31 out
of 35 significant quantity NTBs. This positive relationship indicates that unencumbered
exporters gain from their preferential status. Threat diversion effects are nearly equally
divided between positive and negative coefficients while preferential quality NTBs, twice
as often as not, yield a negative coefficient. This negative relationship, when observed,
suggests that the quality upgrading of countries facing the NTB generally reduces the export opportunities for unencumbered countries to low quality varieties. 9 As the price of
these varieties will naturally be lower, the value of the bilateral trade flow may actually
fall for unencumbered exporters.
Finally, there is evidence of trade compression arising from NTBs, in particular
for quality NTBs, as positive coefficients outnumber negative coefficients by almost five to
one. At the same time, however, the estimated coefficients are very close to zero, so any
compressing effect is small.
In this section, we have shown that, while tariffs and NTBs have

gene~ally

pre-

dictable effects, there is a significant variability in the magnitude of effects. Some tariffs
reduce trade by a lot, some preferences divert trade more than others and some NTBs
raise the value of bilateral trade while comparable NTBs in different industries lower the
bilateral value of trade. The industry by industry comparisons in Table 5 suggest the
possibility of explaining these differences with industry characteristics. This exercise is the
objective of the Next section.

9 See Feenstra, 1988, for more evidence on quality upgrading in the face of barriers to trade.
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V. Explaining the Effectiveness of Barriers
In this section, we shed light on possible determinants of variability in the coefficient estimates presented above. Our approach is to regress the estimated coefficients
for each effect (such as the estimated coefficients for the tariff diversion effect) on industry characteristics which we believe may account for a differential impact (i. e., different
coefficients) across industries. In other words, we use the regression coefficients from the
Tobit regressions discussed in Section 4 as dependent variables in a second-stage regression. Weighted least squares is used where the weights are the estimated standard errors
of the coefficients from the first-stage (Tobit y regressions. Our investigation is limited
to the three estimated tariff effects as well as the difference between the tariff diversion
and reduction effects, the NTB reduction effect, and the country pair effects: distance,
contiguity and language. 10
The only formal theory available to guide our investigation is the standard homogeneous goods, partial equilibrium analysis. In this framework, the elasticity of import
demand is the primary determinant of the impact of barriers on bilateral trade. The
presence of product differentiation should therefore also be a determinant of the impact of
barriers. Reliable measures of elasticities and product differentiation are, however, difficult
to come by.11 We therefore include as regressors industry characteristics thought to be
related to demand elasticities and product differentiation.
Our primary measure of product differentiation is the 3-digit SIC code of the coefficient's industry. As noted above, there appears to be a rough correspondence between
the value of an industry's SIC code and the level of product differentiation within the
industry. As a secondary measure (which is not available for all industries), we include a
continuous variable that indicates the extent to which goods in the industry are traded
on an organized exchange (and, hence, are homogeneous), have a reference price, or are
differentiated products. 12 We also include measures of skilled labor and capital intensity
for each industry.13 The notion underlying the inclusion of these measures is that there is
10 Discussion of NTB effects are limited to reduction effects both for the sake of brevity and our concerns noted
above about the quality of our NTB measures.
11 We have available estimated import demand elasticities only for the U.S. Using the U.S. estimates yields
insignificant coefficients and provides little insight into the issue at hand.
12 This indicator is constructed by assigning a zero value to trade in goods for which there is an organized exchange,
a value of one to goods for which there is a reference price and a two for differentiated products, according to
the mapping used by Rauch, 1998. Our measure is then a 3-digit SIC industry weighted average over all trade
in that industry. Using this continuous variable provides the same insight that would be gained from including
separate variables indicating the presence of the three types.
13 These indicator variables are taken from Cline, 1997, page 240.
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a greater degree of product differentiation, and hence smaller demand elasticities, among
capital and skilled labor intensive products than among unskilled labor intensive products.
As an additional indicator of demand elasticities and factor intensities, we also include a
dummy variable equal to one if the industry provides primarily natural resource goods.
Again, our notion is that natural resource trade is relatively homogeneous; however, bilateral demand elasticities might well be low for these products, because few countries serve
as a source of supply.
We expect that physical and human capital intensive products will have smaller
trade diversion and compression coefficients because of the greater degree of product differentiation vis-a-vis low-skill intensive industries. For the latter industries, we expect
substantial within industry substitution as importers will be quick to source from the lowest cost (lowest tariff) supplier. Similarly, the compression effect should be greater for labor
and natural resource intensive products as purchases of homogeneous goods will become
increasingly concentrated in the largest single supplier, hence minimizing exporter-specific
fixed costs of trade.
We also include the average distance over which goods are shipped within our
sample of importers. A higher average distance brings with it several possible implications.
First, it is possible that the product has relatively few suppliers. Alternatively, it may
be an indication that the product contains a higher degree of differentiation and either
importers will purchase from distant suppliers alone, in order to obtain the optimal variety,
or importers will buy from many suppliers, even distant ones. Finally, our regressors also
include the presence of other types of barriers so that we can measure the extent to which
the presence of one type of barrier (tariff or NTB) influences the effects of the other.
In Table 6, we present the results from 11 separate regressions. The table presents
the estimated elasticity of the coefficient with respect to regressors. We report results from
two sets of regressions. The first regression, which covers all 158 industries, provides the
results for all columns in the table with the exception of the right-most column labelled
Rauch. This final column is from a regression that omits the SIC-3 code and inserts our
continuous indicator of product differentiation. This regression is limited by the coverage
of the Rauch coding scheme to approximately two-thirds of our industries. We omit the
elasticities from the other variables in the presentation of this second regression as they
are qualitatively identical to those from the first regression.
Before proceeding to specific results for the regressors, note the very high R2 s in
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Table 6
Explaining the Effectiveness of Barriers 1
(Entries are estimated elasticities.)

Tariff

NTH

Dist

Tariff Variables
0.6 c
Reduction
0.7 0
c
Diversion
0.8
-0.3
Div-Red
0.5 0 -1.3 0
-LIb
-0.2
Compression
Non-Tariff Reduction Variables
4.6 0
-3.1 b
Price
-1.0
Quantity
-0.7
-0.6
Quality
-0.7
0.6
-0.1
Threat
Other Barriers to Trade
O.l b
0.0
Distance
-0.2 b
Border
0.1
-o.3 b
c
-0.1
-0.2
Language
0.2

Capital
Int.

Skill
Int.

Nat.
Res.

Industry
(SIC-3)

R2

Rauch 2

-0.1
O.Ob
0.0
0.0

0.1
0.0
-0.1
0.0

-O.l c
-O.l c

-0.1
-0.1

1.6 b
-0.2
1.3 0
-0.3

0.65
0.88
0044
0.58

004
0.5 b
0.2
-2.1 c

-0.2
1.1
-0.1
-1.5 b

0.8
0.9
-0.1
0.1

-1.7
1.8
0.0
-0.8

-10.l b
7.7 b
1.0
204

0.14
0.10
0.27
0.24

-1I5.0 c
-12.9b
1.2
-004

0.0 0
0.0
-0.1 0

0.0

0.0
0.0

OA c

0.97
0.92
0.84

0.3 c
-0.7 c
004 0

-O.lc

0.0

-O.l c

-D.5 c
-004 0

1a is sig at 10%, b is sig at 5%, c is sig at 1%. The number of observations in each regression is equal to the
number of estimated coefficients, significant or otherwise, as reported in Table 4.
2Rauch is from Rauch, 1998. The coefficient estimates reported here are from regressions with a limited sample
size. See text for details.

the three tariff effect regressions and three country pair regressions; this suggests that it is
indeed something systematic and estimable that is driving the regression results. Further
note the small R2s in the NTB regressions; we interpret those small R 2s as further evidence
of the measurement error (and, hence, greater noise) in the NTB effects.
Consider first the tariff reduction equation. Positive coefficients suggest smaller
reduction effects. The largest elasticity is the industry's 3-digit SIC code; this suggests
that the trade reducing effect of a tariff is less the greater the product differentiation within
the industry. That is, the more prevalent varieties are within an industry the less effective
are tariffs at reducing trade. Further, and not surprisingly, the greater the NTB coverage
within an industry, the less effective is a tariff in reducing trade. Finally, increasing natural
resource intensity reduces the effectiveness of tariffs.
In the tariff diversion equation, only the NTB and natural resource regressors are
significant (though the R2 is very high). The greater the presence ofNTBs the less propensity there is for diversion. The more resource intensive is the industry, the greater are the
trade diverting effects. The Rauch indicator suggests, reasonably, that more product dif-
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ferentiation leads to less diversion. Finally, the "Div-Red", the difference between the
foreign/foreign and the home/foreign elasticities is reduced by the presence of NTBs, increased by the distance over which goods travel on average and decreased with product
differentiation; all of which are consistent with home bias for homogeneous goods and
willingness to pay for variety, foreign or domestic, for differentiated products.
The tariff compression equation suggests that compression is less the further apart
are the trading partners, and the greater is product

differentia~ion within

the industry.

Both of which suggest that a love of variety can compensate for additional costs, fixed or
otherwise, of trading.
The tariff regressor in the NTB reduction effect regressions provide somewhat less
insight than does the NTB regressor in the tariff regressions. In only the price regression is
the relationship significant and it is positive. An implication is that imposing price NTBs
occurs where protection is relatively effective, and hence more prevalent. The varieties or
product differentiation effect as measured by the 3-digit SIC code is significant in the price
and quantity regressions; though the signs on the Rauch and industry variables contradict
one another. The implication is that price NTBs tend to lower the value of trade the
greater is product differentiation, while the effect is opposite, and more complicated, for
quantity NTBs. Finally, we note that the regressors in the price equation tend to have
signs opposite those of the coefficients in the quantity regression.
In the distance, contiguity and language regressions a result that stands out is the
importance of product differentiation, whether measured by the SIC code or the Rauch
measure. In particular, as product differentiation increases, the importance of distance,
contiguity and language falls; an important caveat to this observation is the disagreement
between the SIC and Rauch coefficients in the language regression. Our finding is consistent
with Rauch (1998) in that links between countries appear to be more important the more
difficult it is to obtain information on alternative varieties. While the SIC code is unable
to disentangle this effect, the Rauch indicator is. The coefficients on the other variables
are generally consistent with this finding. The strength of these results reinforces the
notion that demand elasticities are playing a significant role in determining the effectiveness
of trade barriers. In particular, trade resistors or facilitators become less important as
determinants of trade flows the greater the demand for variety, or equivalently, the smaller
the bilateral import demand elasticity.
In this section, we have explored the determinants of the effectiveness of various
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barriers. The working hypothesis centers around the extent of product differentiation in
. each industry as well as the elasticity of demand, for which we have found broad, but not
uniform, support. Of particular importance, we believe, is the result that tariff barriers
are less effective in the presence of a demand for variety and bilateral preferences are less
important for goods with a greater degree of product differentiation. The NTB results
are less compelling, although there is some evidence that they perform similarly, and
their impact is lessened by the presence of product differentiation. There do appear to
be systematic patterns within the distribution of NTB coefficients, but we are unable to
explain them at this time.

VI. Conclusion
Successive rounds of GATT negotiations have focused on the reduction of tariff
and non-tariff barriers to international trade. This study provides the first comprehensive
analysis of the extent to which bilateral trade patterns are influenced by differential rates
of protection across industries and countries. It is unique in that it employs data at the 6digit HS code level, data that is significantly more disaggregated than is commonly found in
this literature. As such, this study is able to highlight and analyze the significant diversity
in the effectiveness of tariff and non-tariff barriers across industries.
The results presented in sections 4 and 5 extend the literature in several ways. Not
only is the empirical analysis focused on. disaggregated industries, but this disaggregation
permits decomposition of the effects of tariffs and NTBs into trade reduction, trade diversion and trade compression effects; both of these latter two effects represent innovations in
the analysis of trade distortions. This type of decomposition has a great deal of policy relevance as it permits the identification of specific channels through which protection affects
the magnitude of trade, as well as the relative strengths (effectiveness) of these channels. 14
Our results indicate that trade diversion is significant. That is, preferentially reducing a barrier generally results in a greater increase in trade with the preferred country
than would result from a reduction in the multilateral tariff; this differential is often quite
large. This also suggests a significant home bias in many industries; that is, the elasticity
of substitution is greater between foreign vari~ties than it is between domestic production
14 As discussed in section 3, an additional benefit of conducting the analysis on such highly disaggregated data is
the mitigation of specification error that results from greater industry homogeneity in each regression.
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and imports. FUrthermore, it calls into question the extent to which domestic producers
receive any relief from the maintenance of barriers against a subset of exporters.
We further provide evidence of the trade compressing effects of tariffs that result
from the presence of country-specific fixed costs of trading. As the average multilateral
tariff rises, the trade reducing effect falls disproportionately on smaller potential exporters.
This is important not only because it helps us understand the effect of barriers to trade,
but because it provides potential insight into the behavior of some exporters. Notably,
some developing countries have adopted the strategy of exporting a variety of products
from a small number of industries, rather than diversifying the product space spanned by
their exports. While there are many other reasons countries might pursue this strategy,
our results suggest that this makes them large exporters in a small number of sectors,
rather than small exporters in a large number of sectors. As such, they will be less likely
to be on the short end of the compression stick.
Our investigation into the determinants of the effectiveness of various barriers
across industries suggests a significant correlation with variables indicating the presence of
variety or product differentiation in the industry. This is not surprising as demand elasticities are likely to be lower in these industries and the distorting effect of trade barriers
is similarly likely to be lower in industries with low demand elasticities. In the case of
NTBs, however, the results of this study should be interpreted with some caution as we
have concerns over the quality of the available data.
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APPENDIX A

Theoretical Background For the Estimating Equation
In this appendix, we present the theoretical construct that provides the basis for our
estimating equation. In particular, we develop equation (3), from Section II of the main text. The
framework is one in which there are multiple sectors, J(, each one of which is monopolistically
competitive. In addition, we build in scope for the elasticity of substitution between varieties in
each sector to be different when considering domestic varieties versus foreign varieties.
Our derivation borrows heavily from Krugman (1980) and Anderson (1979). Total utility
is an aggregation over the J( sectors.

In the absence of differentiation based on home versus foreign status of the variety, the sub-utility
function for each sector is aCES aggregator over varieties in that sector, or
(A.l)

where f) = U;1 and (1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Demand for a single variety
of good k at location j is then
(ti'P .)-U
m I··] -- y..1 ] ]
(A.2)

Pi

where Pi is an index of prices in country i given by

= (I:(tijPj)I-U).

Pi

j

Equation (A.2) gives us bilateral imports by country i from country j of a single variety of good k.
Generating total bilateral imports in sector k requires the determination of the number of varieties
produced by country j.
On the production side, there are four major equations, expressing the production technology, the price of the good as a markup over marginal cost, the quantity of each variety, and the
number of varieties.
(production technology) (A.3)
Lj = a+bXj
PJ'

=

(markup over marginal cost) (AA)

f)-I (bWj )

a

f)

X·----

(quantity of each variety) (A.5)
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= a(l

~ f))

(number of varieties) (A.6)

To arrive at the total volume of imports between two countries, note that all varieties in
a country will have the same price and face the same vector of bilateral trade costs. This gives us
the import demand over all varieties nj as

(ti"P")-U
]
M I··] -- n ] .y..1 Jp~

(demand all varieties) (A.7)
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where the price index, Pi is now
p!1 -- 'L....J
" nJ-(t-IJ-pJ_)1-0- .

(new price index) (A.8)

j

Substituting for the number of varieties, and noting that th~ bilateral volume of imports in a
sector depends on i's expenditure, and j's output, just as in the one sector model, we arrive at the
following expression for bilateral imports of good k.

(A.9)
where
" IIkv
Pik = 'L....J
.II (P,ktkil )1-0- .
I

and we have denoted
output.

af

as the share of i's income spent on k, and Ij as the share of k in j's

In the absence of a preference for home varieties, equation (A.9) would form the basis for
our estimation. However, we wish to capture this effect and implement it as follows. First, the
sub-utility function in equation (A.I) is modified to incorporate a different elasticity of substitution
between foreign and domestic varieties. This is accomplished by positing the following nested CES
functional form

(A.IO)

e;l

where 1 now indexes foreign varieties and r indexes domestic varieties and 0 =
where p is the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties. From this utility function, we can
derive an equation for country i's expenditures on foreign varieties as
(A.H)

where

rf = (PikTjk)I-P + (Pik*)I-

p

with Pik * defined as the price index over domestically produced goods and p jk is a price index over
foreign varieties. Both of these indices are defined by equation (A.8).
Including this modification to expenditures on foreign varieties in equation (A.9), we arrive
at our equation specifying the demand by country i for imports from country j in sector k:

APPENDIX B

3 Digit SIC Industries
SIC
011
013
016
017
018
020
027
081
083
091
109
122
131
132
141
142
145
147
149
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
221
223
224
225
227
228
229
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

Description
Cash grains
Field crops (exd. 011)
Vegetables and melons
Fruits and tree nuts
Horticultural items
Livestock
Animal Specialities
Timber Tracts
Forest products
Commercial fishing
Misc. metal ores
Bit. Coal & Lignite Mining
Crude Petroleum / Gas
Natural Gas Liquids
Dimension Stone
Crushed/Broken Stone
Clay, Ceramic, etc.
Chemical/Fertilizer Minerals
Miscellaneous Nonmetallic Minerals
Meat Products
Dairy Products
Preserved Fruits/Vegetables
Grain Mill Products
Bakery Products
Sugar / Confectionery
Fats and Oils
Beverages
Misc. Food Products
Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton
Broadwoven Fabric & Mills, Wool
Narrow Fabric Mills
Knitting Mills
Carpets and Rugs
Yarn and Thread Mills
Misc.s Textile Goods
Men's, Boys' Suit/Coat
Men's,Boys' Furnishing
Women's, Misses' Outerwear
Women's, Children's Undergarments
Hats, Caps, Millinery
Girls, Children's Outerwear
Fur Goods
Misc. Apparel etc.
Misc. Fab. Textile parts

Ind ustry Type

Factor Int.

cereals etc.
tropical agr.
tropical agr
tropical agr.
tropical agr.
animal prod ucts
animal products
forest products
forest products
animal products
raw materials
raw materials
petroleum
petroleum
raw materials
raw materials
raw materials
raw materials
raw materials
animal 'products
animal products
tropical ago
cereals etc.
cereals etc.
tropical ago
tropical ago
tropical ago
cereals etc.
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive

unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
capital int
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
capital int
unskilled
unskilled
capital int
capital int
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
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Table B.l
3-Digit SIC Categories (con't)
SIC

241
242
243
244
245
249
251
259
261
262
265
271
273
275
276
277
281
282
283
285
286
287
289
291
295
299
301
302
305
306

308
311
313
314
316
317
319
321
322
325
326
327
328
329
330
332
333

Description
Logging
Sawmills, Planing Mills
Millwork, Plywood & Structural Mbrs
Wood Containers
Wood Buildings Mobile Homes
Misc. Wood Products
Household Furniture
Misc. Furniture etc.
Pulp Mills
Paper Mills
Paperboard Containers
Newspapers
Books
Commercial Printing
Manifold Business Forms
Blankbooks and Bookbinding
Ind. Inorg. Chemicals
Plastics, Synthetics
Drugs
Paints etc.
Ind. Organic Chemicals
Agricultural Chemicals
Misc. Chemicals
Petroleum Refining
Asphalt Paving and Roofing Mat.
Misc. Petroleum Coal Products
Tires and Inner Tubes
Rubber, Plastics & Footwear
Hose & Belting & Gaskets & Packing
Fabricated Rubber
Misc.Plastics
Leather Tanning and Finishing
Footwear Cut Stock
Footwear (excl Rubber)
Luggage
Handbags etc.
Leather Goods, NEC
Flat Glass
Glass / Glassware
Structural Clay parts
Pottery etc.
Concrete, Gypsum etc.
Cut Stone / Stone parts
Misc. Nonmetallic Mineral Products
Blast Furnace & Basic Steel Products
Iron and Steel Foundry
Primary Nonferrous Metals

Industry Type

Factor Int.

forest products
forest products
forest products
forest products
forest products
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
forest products
forest products
forest products
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
chemicals
chemicals
chemicals
chemicals
chemicals
chemicals
chemicals
petroleum
petroleum
petroleum
capital-intensive
labor-intensive
capital-intensive
capital-intensive
chemicals
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
capital-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
labor-intensive
capital-intensive
machinery
capital-intensive

unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
capital int
capital int
capital int
skilled
skilled
skilled
skilled
skilled
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
capital int
skilled
capital int
capital int
unskilled
capital int
capital int
capital int
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
unskilled
capital int
unskilled
skilled
skilled
skilled
unskilled
unskilledunskilled
capital int
skilled
capital int

APPENDIX C
Issues on the Interpretation of Results
Let us consider a pair of countries, i and j. When, ceteris paribus, trade between i and j
is "large" or "out-of-line" in comparison with trade in that good for other exporters, we say that
trade is "large" between i and j. On the other hand, if trade is small in comparison with other
countries, we say that trade is "small." Finally, if the level of trade is similar, we will say that
trade is "normal."
Importers choose to impose barriers for a number of reasons. Trade need not necessarily
be large for a trade barrier to be imposed. A barrier can be imposed against all exporters when
trade is normal for all exporters; for instance, to protect a declining industry. It is also possible
that a barrier could be selectively imposed against j when trade is small. This case is unlikely as
it implies that a barrier is imposed against countries with whom trade is small, but not against
exporters for whom trade is large or normal. However, we cannot rule out this case since barriers
are often imposed for political reasons, such as barriers imposed against Iraq following the invasion
of Kuwait. However, it seems reasonable to state that it is least common for barriers to be imposed
when trade is small.
Consider a case where a barrier is imposed against a country and good for which trade is
large, then a positive and significant barrier coefficient means that the barrier was not effective,
or that it had an effect in lowering trade but it did not lower trade below or commensurate with
that of other countries. Regression coefficients measure partial correlations: a positive coefficient
on a barrier only implies positive partial correlations between trade and the barrier to trade. Note
that an insignificant coefficient does not necessarily imply an ineffective barrier. It can mean that
the barrier was imposed against a good and country where trade was large and the barrier was
effective in bringing trade back to a normal level. A negative, significant coefficient would appear
to unambiguously imply an effective barrier. However, this is not necessarily the case. If the barrier
is imposed against a country with small trade, then the coefficient could be negative and significant
even if the barrier has no effect on trade. In what follows, we illustrate, for our particular set of
variables, just what particular coefficient values might or might not mean.
The followi~g table gives possible outcomes for coefficients on our average tariff measure,
TAR~, and our trade diversion variable, TARDivt. Column headings refer to the trade level
descriptions given above. Row headings refer to whether the tariff measure does or does not effect
trade. Note, " - " means negative and significant and" + " means positive and significant while"
means insignificant (regardless of the sign of the coefficient).

°"

Average Tariff Variable

Effective
Not Effective

Large

Normal

+,0,-

°

+

Small

A few conclusions can be reached from an examination of the tariff measures. First, a
positive, significant coefficient implies that the barrier has been imposed. where trade is large,
regardless of whether the barrier is effective. Second, an insignificant coefficient implies that a
barrier was not imposed in a situation where trade was small; again, regardless of whether it is
effective. Finally, if we are willing to rule out the possibility that, as a general rule, barriers are
imposed where trade is small, or that such a case is rare (a reasonable position), then a negative,
significant coefficient implies an effective barrier.
The coefficients on the NTB variables are subject to similar, though more complicated
interpretations. The complication arises because an effective barrier may well yield an increased
value of trade.
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